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 Abstract 
In 2009 the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted the eXtensible 
Business Reporting Language (XBRL) system to improve the process by which financial 
statements can be used. Interactive financial data filed with the SEC using XBRL provides easily 
readable and comparable financial data, thereby improving transparency and efficiency in the 
corporate market. SEC rules permit companies to use custom tags in their financial reports in cases 
when an appropriate element cannot be found in the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) standard XBRL taxonomy. The inordinate use of custom tags may result in a reduction of 
financial report quality by diminishing the comparability and usability of filings by investors and 
analysts. Using XBRL-based empirical data from 2015 to 2017 fiscal years, this paper explores 
the inordinate use of custom tags. Do high uses of custom tags result from the complexity of a 
company’s operational structure or are they used deliberately by managers attempting to 
manipulate their financial disclosures? I find that the use of custom tags is positively related to 
variables indicating the lower quality of financial reports.  
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1. Introduction 
The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) entails the 
enforcement of transparency within the US corporate sector by maintaining fair, orderly and 
efficient markets, facilitating capital formation and protecting its investors (SEC, 2019). The 
SEC’s role in regulating US stock markets and providing accurate and consistent information 
regarding financial disclosure and profitability is essential to the strong functioning of the US 
economy. Since 2009, the SEC has focused on expanding its data organization technology and has 
transitioned to the use of structured data through eXtensible Business Reporting Language 
(XBRL). XBRL is a data standard used for structuring information contained in unstructured 
financial statements. The SEC implementation of XBRL, however, allows for the potential of 
compromised data collection by permitting the use of unstandardized data input, thereby reducing 
the comparability of financial data analysis. This paper disambiguates and identifies factors that 
correlate with inordinate use of custom tags within firms that file with the SEC, thus contributing 
to the goal of greater transparency in US markets. 
XBRL is implemented to facilitate automated production and consumption of high-volume 
data measuring business performances (Liu, Luo, Sia, O'farrell, Teo, 2014). XBRL’s structure 
allows for immediate processing and web access of corporate information, offering a computerized 
language for financial reporting that can be easily read, extracted and compared by computers. 
This system improves transparency of corporate filings increasing financial market efficiency and 
supplying important data for construction of decision models (SEC, 2006). Transitioning from 
traditional financial reports to XBRL is reliant on the US Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (US GAAP) taxonomy maintained and updated annually by the Financial Accounting 
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Standards Board (FASB). The FASB taxonomy provides a comprehensive dictionary of business 
reporting elements (tags) that represent accounting concepts necessary for the disclosure of 
financial information. SEC rules, however, permit companies to deviate from the FASB Taxonomy 
in cases when an appropriate element cannot be found to tag a particular disclosure in the 
company’s filing. The company’s taxonomy can be created using firm-specific custom tags also 
known as ‘extensions’. Extensions reduce the comparability of a company's financial information 
vis a vis other companies, because custom tags confound the interpretation of data by their 
computer programs. 
Previous research finds that a divergence from the standard taxonomy can reduce 
comparability, creating complications for digesting financial information (Dhole, Lobo, Mishra, 
and Pal, 2015). Taxonomy extensions complicate interpretation of business data, since custom tags 
do not correspond with the standard taxonomy used by other companies in the same industry. 
Excessive use of custom tags may indicate two different things (perhaps simultaneously): (1) 
complex operations; and/or (2) low-quality of financial reports. In the first instance, the company’s 
appropriate implementation of custom tags to disclose values not yet defined in the US GAAP 
taxonomy indicate correct application of the SEC rules. Another instance, however, may indicate 
equivocal uses of custom tags to mask questionable activities of the company resulting in low-
quality of financial reports. This paper explores whether the use of custom tags correlates with the 
complexity of the business or is an intentional manipulation of reported values by corporate 
managers.  
A high-quality financial report is identified by its readily understandable and clear 
disclosure of relevant information of the financial statements. Reliable financial reports must be 
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free of material error, faithfully representing all activities utilized by the company (FASB, 2019). 
These reports must be comparable to the financial information presented for other accounting 
periods and firms in the same industry (Bragg, 2018). Consistency in financial statements is 
imperative for maintaining economic and business stability. Distorted reporting may lead to 
suboptimal deployments of capital, misallocation of resources and potentially create an ambiguous 
information environment for financial analysts to conduct their investment analyses. Investors who 
rely on accuracy of financial reports can be negatively affected by investing in companies with 
inflated or questionable values. This in turn may skew significant business and strategic decisions 
based on a flawed interpretation of economic reality (SEC, 2006). Inaccuracy of financial 
statements due to either complexity or low-quality of financial reports may result in an erosion of 
confidence. A low-quality financial report refers to the company’s attempt to conceal its bona fide 
business performance, reducing its comparability. Analyzing XBRL-based data, I examine the 
relationship between a firm’s inordinate use of extensions, which may be indicative of complexity 
and/or low-quality of financial reporting. 
Low-quality financial disclosures can have significantly detrimental effects on financial 
markets and engender shocks to the economy (SEC, 2006). The SEC posits that XBRL increases 
market efficiency by providing access to all financial information, expanding the scope of research 
for analysts and investors, thereby increasing overall market liquidity (Cong, Hao, and Zou, 2014). 
This paper hypothesizes that companies with low financial reporting quality, as well as those 
companies with complex corporate structures will use more custom tags. The results of my analysis 
are consistent with the hypothesis that firms with low-quality financial reporting use more custom 
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tags. The coefficients on the measures for complexity, however, show that complex firms are not 
necessarily associated with more custom tags. 
 The study proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides in-depth background information and a 
subsequent literature review. Section 3 describes the methodology and key variables used to derive 
results for the regression. Section 4 explains the data collection and Section 5 discusses the results 
and implications of findings. The paper concludes with a summary of results, limitations and 
further prospects for the research.  
2. Literature Review 
Twenty first century society is increasingly reliant on the manipulation of complex data as 
a means to produce information. This creates a need to integrate rigorous data analytics in the 
study of socio-economics factors impacting every aspect of life. Cloud based structured data has 
become essential for quantitative research. Establishing an environment where data is readily 
available for interpretation, it provides us with accessible and discrete bytes for analysis by both 
humans and computers, communicating information that will provide building blocks for political 
and economic policy. Structured data for these purposes is created using standards including 
XBRL which leverages XML syntax.  
The US Securities and Exchange Commission mandates that public companies file annual 
financial status reporting. In 2009 the SEC adopted an XBRL system as a means to improve the 
usefulness of 10Q|K financial filings. The Final Rule No. 33-9002 (Interactive Data to improve 
Financial Reporting Rule), enforced by the SEC in late 2009, required all public companies filing 
with the SEC to use XBRL as a standard for business reporting. The use of XBRL is meant to 
simplify the exchange and communication of financial statement information.  
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XBRL-based financial data facilitates effective retrieval and use of financial information 
while also contributing to an automated regulation process conducted by the SEC. XBRL 
technology allows for the structuring of quantitative financial and business data through tags, using 
relevant components of over 20,000 standard official elements approved by the SEC as of 2019, 
in the US GAAP Taxonomy (FASB, 2019). In addition, the SEC allows for customized extension 
elements. While standard tags structured by the SEC, and the FASB reflect the disclosure 
requirements of the US GAAP and common financial reporting practices of companies, custom 
tags are to be used only if a standard tag does not fully explain/map to the disclosed value in the 
financial statements and footnotes. 
The use of company-specific custom tags in disclosing financial data reduces the 
comparability of data across firms. Dhole, Lobo, Mishra and Pal (2015) identified the importance 
of standard tags in decreasing the complexity of accessible data and improving the financial 
market’s information environment. Several studies report that standard tags improve 
comparability, reducing information asymmetry and processing costs while customized extensions 
increase it (Dhole, Lobo, Mishra and Pal, 2015; Tylor and Dzuranin, 2010). Studies focusing on 
identifying fraudulence in managerial behavior, show that accruals-based earnings management 
declined more for firms that use more standard taxonomy tags, suggesting that the use of 
extensions renders financial statements less transparent and more subject to earnings manipulation. 
These findings are consistent with the argument that extensions are harder to interpret (Felo, Kim 
and Lim, 2018; Li and Nwaeze, 2016; Kim, Kim and Lim, 2013).  
These findings suggest that the use of XBRL in analysis reduces error and maximizes 
accuracy of results in analyzing data relevant to the functioning of markets and the economy. The 
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SEC is the main regulator of business and financial drivers of the US economy. Since the adoption 
of interactive data consumption within the SEC, filings have been regulated to provide a structured 
basis for simplified analysis. Information disclosed by XBRL thus becomes more accessible to 
financial statement users. Arnold, Bedard, Phillips and Sutton (2012) find that both professional 
and non-professional investors, in fact, make better use of XBRL tagged information. The format 
consisting of this type of data makes it easier for users to evaluate statement information in a time 
sensitive manner by simplifying access and comparison of filed information. This in turn translates 
into improved decision making by investors, increasing firm disclosure and market efficiency. 
However, adoption of detailed tagging1 results in an increased number of standard as well as 
custom XBRL tags. This may increase the opportunity costs of processing XBRL financial 
information, since a large number of custom tags may result in the ignoring of essential financial 
information that is difficult to compare or process. Other negative results of relatively high use of 
custom tags include an increase in processing costs (slower preparation time and accuracy of 
analyzing financial data) for investors and analysts and increased potential for manager’s 
manipulation of financial information (Li and Nwaeze, 2015).  
This research contributes to insights into the usage of custom tags. Is it the complexity of 
a company or possible managerial manipulation that drives up the percentage of custom tag usage 
in a firm? This present research contributes to the area of financial reporting investigation by 
showing that the use of custom tags may be an additional indicator of aberrant behavior in publicly 
traded companies. I interrogate the economic and empirical implications of measuring complexity 
and the low-quality of financial disclosures of public firms. 
                                               
1 Detailed tagging indicates the tagging of quantitative amounts disclosed in the footnotes of the financial 
statements. 
7 
3. Methodology  
Utilizing linear regression model with clustered standard errors (CSE), I estimate the 
percentage of custom tags and the dollar value tagged by extensions on measures of complexity 
and low-quality financial disclosures. To validate the research hypothesis, t-statistics and p-values 
are used to examine the significance of the regression models and test their coefficients, indicating 
the relationship between the types of companies and the amount of extensions they use. To address 
possible heterogeneity in the data, the model specifies a robust clustering of standard errors.  
Proxies for complexity of a firm include a fraction of intangible assets to total assets, and 
the number of segments in each company. Proxies for low-quality financial disclosures are: 
‘unqualified’ auditor’s opinion and two measures of material weaknesses. Variables are defined 
and discussed in the next section. 
1. Customit = β0 + β1lnIntan_tait+ β2Unqualifiedit + β3BigFourit + β4Segmentit + β5Weaknessit 
+ εit 
2. Customit = β0 + β1lnIntan_tait+ β2Unqualifiedit + β3BigFourit + β4Segmentit + 
β5CountWeaknessit + εit 
where Custom is the dependent variable representing a percentage of custom tags. The indices i 
and t indicate entity and time, respectively and β is the coefficient estimate for the association of 
independent variables with the outcome variable. lnIntan_ta is the independent variable indicating 
the log of intangible assets over the log of total assets. Unqualified is a dummy variable indicating 
whether a company received ‘unqualified’ opinion rating on a financial statement from the auditor, 
BigFour is a dummy indicating whether a company was audited by the Big Four auditing firms 
and Segment is a count variable representing the number of segments in a company. Weakness is 
a dummy signifying the material weaknesses issued by the auditor under Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
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Section 404 in the financial statement. Finally, Count Weakness is a count of all material 
weaknesses found in each financial statement. Since variables for Weakness and Count Weakness 
are interdependent and therefore, highly correlated, two separate regressions are used to estimate 
the effects of material weaknesses on the use of extensions.  
The second linear model regresses the same independent variables on the dollar value of 
custom tags over total assets – Custom Value: 
3. Custom Valueit =β0 + β1lnIntan_tait+ β2Unqualifiedit + β3BigFourit + β4Segmentit + 
β5Weaknessit + εit 
 
4. Custom Valueit = β0 + β1lnIntan_tait+ β2Unqualifiedit + β3BigFourit + β4Segmentit +         
β5CountWeaknessit + εit 
Additional testing in this study includes a fixed effects regression model with the company 
and time-specific fixed effects.  
3.1 Dependent variables  
The study considers two possible measures of the use of custom tags. 
The percentage of custom tags relative to standard tags used by each company (Custom). 
This is calculated by dividing the count of XBRL extensions over the total count of tags for a 
single firm for a given filing. The value represents firms with a higher percentage use of extensions 
in their financial reports.  
The second outcome variable is the dollar value tagged using custom tags (Custom Value). 
It is obtained by dividing a disclosed dollar amount of a custom tag over a firm’s total assets. The 
value is then averaged per firm-year filing. The variable indicates whether a company is using 
extensions to mask significant dollar amounts.  
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3.2 Independent variables 
On the right side of the regression model a number of variables were selected to 
characterize the complexity of a firm and low-quality financial disclosure. 
a. Measures of complexity 
1. Intangible Assets/Total Assets (lnIntan_ta).  
 To measure complexity, the study uses the natural logarithm of intangible assets 
(Compustat variable INTAN) over the total assets (Compustat variable TA) of a company.  
Intangible assets which represent the information uncertainty in the filing are scaled by the total 
assets which are, per se, a proxy for the company’s size, the resulting independent variable is 
indicative of the level of uncertainty presented by intangible assets. Intangible assets are harder to 
evaluate and therefore insinuate complexity within the financial statement (Lev, 2000; Skroupa, 
2017). Corporations increase their total market value by expanding the use of intangibles since 
they represent a company’s potential revenue and growth. This proposed variable proxies for the 
complexity of a company; it accounts for intangible assets which represent a value of the business 
and its long-term prospects in proportion to the company's overall assets. I expect a positive 
significant correlation of lnIntan_ta and the use of custom tags.  
2. Number of segments in a company (Segments) 
Another measurement of complexity in the model is the count of segments (Segments) in 
each firm. This method is consistently used by the accounting literature to proxy for business 
complexity. Several studies find that a high count of segments for a company is associated with 
lower financial reporting quality (Doyle, Ge, and McVay 2007; Hoitash, Hoitash and Bedard, 
2009). This paper follows previous study examples using segments data to proxy for a company’s 
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complexity. I expect a positive significant correlation between the number of segments and the use 
of custom tags.  
    b.  Measures of low quality in financial statement disclosures. 
 There is a possibility of company’s intentional manipulation of financial data by increased 
use of extensions or through intentional obfuscation of reports by the incorrect use of custom tags 
(Debreceny, Farewell, Piechocki, Felden, Gräning, and d’Eri, 2011). 
1. Material weakness (Count Weakness and Weakness). 
Internal control at the firm-level refers to the assessment of a company’s financial reporting 
reliability and the process of evaluating achievement of that company’s strategic and operational 
goals, as well as assessing of the company’s compliance with applicable laws and regulations. The 
following two variables used to control for the low-quality of financial reports are: a dummy for 
the existence of a material weakness (Weakness) and a count of material weakness for each firm 
(Count Weakness). A material weakness is defined as a deficiency in internal controls of financial 
reports. A material weakness in internal control may result in future difficulties with the financial 
statements. (SEC, 2007). Lashgari, Gawradar and Bakhshayesh (2015) found that companies with 
high material weakness will present reduced financial information quality. A value of 1 is assigned 
to variable Weakness if a company has an existing material weakness in their filing and a value of 
0 if a company has no detected material weakness. While Weakness represents the fact of simply 
having an identified material weakness, observations for Count Weakness indicate the number of 
material weaknesses identified through the assessment of internal controls. Two separate 
regressions show the association of each internal control variable on the use of custom tags. I 
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expect a positive significant correlation between both measures of material weakness and the use 
of custom tags.  
2. Auditor’s opinion (Unqualified). 
 In the United States, auditors provide assurance that financial statements comply with 
accounting regulations; and the SEC has enforcement authority with respect to low-quality 
financial statements. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996), and Beneish and Messod (1999) find 
that US companies face a significant stock price penalty if the SEC decides to pursue them for 
violating accounting standards. Auditors provide investors with independent assurance that the 
firm’s financial statements conform to standard accounting principles. It is important to factor in 
the auditor’s opinion to control for the quality of the financial disclosures. 
 As a last measure of low-quality financial reports, the auditor’s opinion variable 
Unqualified (denoted by a code ranging from 0 to 5) is used to create a dummy specifying financial 
statements that were fairly presented and approved by the auditing firms. Further descriptive 
codification of the audit opinion is listed in Table 2. If a filing was ‘unqualified’ and therefore 
fairly presented and approved by the auditing firm, a value of 1 was assigned to the observation, 
value of 0 was assigned to a firm if an opinion was not ‘unqualified’ (code is greater than 1). These 
filings were accepted on the principles of consistency and adequacy of financial disclosures. I 
expect a negative significant correlation between audit opinion Unqualified and the use of custom 
tags.  
This study uses the existence of a material weakness (Weakness), count of material 
weakness (Count Weakness) and auditor’s opinion (Unqualified), to proxy for lower quality 
financial reporting.   
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       c. Indeterminate: can measure for either complexity or quality of financial report. 
1. Companies audited by the four largest auditing and accounting firms (Big Four). 
A variable (Big Four) represents companies audited by the four largest accounting and 
auditing firms. Prior literature has shown that the Big Four auditors are associated with high 
standard financial reporting, and therefore have consistently been used to proxy for the audit 
quality (Lawrence, Minutti-Meza and Zhang, 2011). Big Four will tend to resolve custom tag usage 
issues by aligning extension elements to the existing taxonomy tags of their client firms. This will 
result in negative significant relationship between the Big Four and the dependent variable. It is 
also important to consider that complex firms using extensions to disclose elements not defined by 
the US GAAP taxonomy will more likely utilize authenticated services of the Big Four, resulting 
in a positive relationship between the Big Four and use custom tags. Assuming the aforementioned 
reasoning, the expected sign on the variable Big Four is indeterminate. Using Compustat variable 
‘AU’, a dummy variable (Big Four) was created to identify companies that were audited by the 
four largest accounting and auditing firms: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Ernst & Young (E&Y), Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler 
(KPMG).  
4. Data 
The 10K XBRL filings submitted to the SEC from Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, 
and Retrieval (EDGAR) for the fiscal years from 2015 through 2017 provided the data for the tags. 
XBRL data for each fiscal year was extracted separately with a total count of 6.5 million 
observations. The final data for the regression analysis identified 4,329 public companies by their 
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Central Index Keys (CIK). Table 1 provides a descriptive statistics of initial data collection. The 
dependent variable is constructed from the EDGAR dataset; it is defined as the percentage of 
custom tags used by each firm for each filing. Independent variables were drawn from Compustat 
and Audit Analytics database through Wharton’s Research and Data Services (WRDS). From 
WRDS, Compustat Fundamentals Annual and Segments (Non-Historical) data, the study selected 
segment observations for all active companies filing within the fiscal years of 2015 through 2017. 
The count of segments for each company was merged with variables from Fundamentals Annual 
to create an initial dataset of independent variables. Variables for internal controls were pulled 
from Auditors and SOX 404 Section of the WRDS Audit Analytics database. The four datasets of 
dependent and independent variables were then merged on columns for CIK and reporting fiscal 
year. Rows with missing data on the right-hand side of the model were removed. The resulting 
dataset yields a total of 11,430 observations for 4,329 firms with variables of company’s 
characteristics. Table 1 further details the changes in the number of observations as the process of 
data cleaning progressed.  
5. Results  
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the panel dataset containing 11,430 observations 
on 4,329 firms. Approximately 18% of all tags were custom in the sample of observations from 
2015 to 2017 fiscal years. ± 62% of all observations were audited by the Big Four auditing firms. 
75% of all observations were rated ‘unqualified’ by auditors on their financial reports; this 
indicates that approximately 25% of observations presented unsatisfactory financial reports as 
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examined by firm’s auditors. 15% of the observations were identified to have some kind of material 
weakness. Mean value on variable Custom Value shows that on average, dollar amounts of custom 
tags are 47% of total assets. Some disclosed custom tags in the data have dollar values that are 
significantly greater than total assets (as indicated by Min and Max columns in Table 5). This 
could in part, be due to the scaling issues of disclosed elements resulting in the incorrect tagging 
of financial information. 
5.2 Correlation matrix 
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix. As expected, variables lnIntan_ta (p = 0.03) and 
Segments (p = 0.04) proxy for the firm’s complexity, are positively correlated with the use of 
custom tags (Custom). Proxies for internal controls Weakness (p = 0.00) and Count Weakness (p 
= 0.00), auditors Big Four (p = 0.00), and auditor's opinion Unqualified (p = 0.01), also show 
positive and significant correlations with the use of custom tags. Correlation matrix also shows 
high significant correlation of the Custom Value to independent variables. Variables Segments (p 
= 0.00), Big Four (p = 0.00) and auditor’s opinion Unqualified (p = 0.00) are negatively correlated 
with Custom Value. Material weakness measures Weakness (p = 0.00) and Count Weakness (p = 
0.00) show positive significant correlation to the outcome variable Custom Value. 
5.3 Estimation Results 
The model is estimated using two outcome variables (Custom and Custom Value) and two 
estimation strategies: clustered standard errors and fixed effects. The clustered standard error 
(CSE) approach allows for the mixture of both within-firm and between firm effects and allows 
for the inclusion of variables which are fixed within firms. The fixed effect approach helps account 
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for omitted characteristics of firms but does not allow estimation of effects for variables which are 
constant within a firm. 
 The regressions for the models are represented in Tables 6, 7 and 8. Table 6 and 7 show 
Clustered Standard Errors model estimation coefficients on the outcome variable Custom and 
Custom Value respectively, while Table 8 shows the results of the Fixed Effects regressions on 
both outcome variables Custom and Custom Value. The following analysis of the regression will 
discuss each model separately. 
5.3.1 Clustered Standard Errors regression results 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6, present the clustered standard errors method to examine the 
effects of independent variables on percent use of extensions (Custom). The difference in the two 
columns are due to the different estimate variables used for internal controls. Column 1 estimates 
the effects of Weakness and Column 2 estimates the effects of Count Weakness. Sign and 
significance of the results for the two regressions are similar. The CSE model corrects for the time 
invariant variables, standard errors, heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the variables. My 
hypothesis suggests that the effect on the use of extensions will be different for firms with different 
characteristics. This model is better for estimating the research hypothesis since it allows for the 
mixture of both within-firm and between firm effects. Variables used to proxy for a company’s 
complexity, including number of segments (Segments) and the ratio of intangible assets to total 
assets (lnIntan_ta), are not significantly correlated with the percent use of extensions. These 
findings do not support the hypothesis that more complex companies may be involved with more 
activities that are unique to the company and/or its sectors and thus require the use of custom tags 
not defined in the standard US GAAP taxonomy. 
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Big Four, Unqualified and material weakness indicators: Weakness and Count Weakness 
are all significant in the CSE regressions Coefficients on the Big Four (CSE 1: t = 5.38 and CSE 
2: t = 4.86) show that companies engaging the services of the Big Four auditing firms are more 
likely to use extensions having on average 2.1 (CSE 1) and 1.9 (CSE 2) percentage points greater 
use of extensions per company over the 3 years of the research period. It is likely that the positive 
correlation between the outcome variable and the Big Four indicates that complex companies (with 
their complex accounting structure) prefer the attested services of the top auditing firms, thereby 
increasing the number of custom tags associated with Big Four audits. The positive coefficient on 
the Big Four may be associated with bona fide custom tags provided by the complex firm. Big 
Four auditors, hired by their respective companies, verify extensions in financial reports: their 
reputation, high standards and best practices validate financial statements and market valuation of 
these companies. Future research on the quality of custom tags legitimated by the Big Four could 
further explain the established results. 
 Coefficient on Unqualified (CSE 1: t = -4.18 and CSE 2: t = -4.55) show that companies 
validated to have adequate financial statements (ie. had ‘unqualified’ ratings for their financial 
reports) used fewer custom tags. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. These 
findings are consistent with the expectations since, receiving an ‘unqualified’ rating in the audit 
reports indicate conformity with auditing standards in the financial statements. In such cases, the 
quality of the financial report is reliable. It is important to note however, that the causal effects of 
the negative coefficient on ‘unqualified’ auditor’s opinion may be reversed: it is possible that firms 
using fewer custom tags are in conformity with the US GAAP and therefore, more likely to get 
‘unqualified’ ratings.   
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 Companies with material weaknesses (Weakness, t = 4.03) were 2.4 percentage points 
more likely to use custom tags. For each additional count of material weaknesses (Count 
Weakness, t = 3.16) extensions in a filing increased by 0.5 percentage points. The above stated 
results are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively, in the CSE model. The 
results are consistent with the expectations and are similar to Hoitash and Hoitash (2018), who 
find that material weakness in a company’s filings correlate with the lower quality of financial 
reports. Higher Weakness symbolizing the inadequacy of the financial statement reliability, 
correlates with higher uses of custom tags, while an auditor's opinion (Unqualified) validated and 
accepted, decrease it. 
In Table 7, the dependent variable is the average of the absolute value of the dollar value 
of custom tags over a firm’s total assets (Custom Value). The model, estimating the relationship 
between a firm’s characteristics and the value of a disclosed extension shows statistical 
significance for all variables except for the variable lnIntan_at.  
   The coefficients on Segments (CSE 1: t= -3.23 and CSE 2: t=-3.30) are statistically 
significant at 5% and 1% levels respectively. The results indicate that for each additional segment 
in a company, the value of a disclosed extension decreases by 0.01 percentage points. This could 
indicate that firms with more segments might disclose smaller dollar values through more uses of 
custom tags. This could also indicate that complex firms may not necessarily use custom tags to 
mask significant dollar values through their extensions.  
Coefficients on the Big Four (CSE 1: t= -2.74 and CSE 2: t=-3.18) indicate that being 
audited by the Big Four reduces the firm’s likelihood of reporting high dollar amounts through 
their custom tags by 0.2 percentage points. Results are significant at 5% and 1% levels 
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respectively. This further implies that Big Four auditing firms legitimate the accurate custom tag 
values that are not questionable with respect to a firm’s operating structure. This means that Big 
Four will not certify high values of custom tags that could indicate masking of certain corporate 
operations. However, further research identifying the quality of custom tags approved by the Big 
Four, can provide further explanations to these findings.  
Coefficients on Unqualified (CSE 1: t= -10.69 and CSE 2: t=-10.39) also show negative 
significant correlation between values of disclosed custom tags and the auditor's opinion. 
Companies with approved and adequate financial statements, report lower dollar values of custom 
tags. Results are significant at the 1% level and are consistent with the expectation that high-quality 
financial reports will have lower values disclosed with custom tags.  
 Variables Weakness (CSE 2: t=4.74) and Count Weakness (CSE 1: t= 4.46) are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Coefficients on the measures of material weakness show that material 
weakness is associated with higher dollar values of custom tags. This suggests that low-quality 
financial reports proxied by material weakness may use extensions to mask significant dollar 
amounts in their financial statements.  
5.3.2 Fixed Effects regression results 
Table 8 displays the results from the linear regression of model 1. Columns 1 - 4 
demonstrate the relationship of all independent variables on the outcome variables Custom and 
Custom Value using firm and time-varying fixed effects. The fixed effects model estimates within 
company effects, prioritizing the changes of variables over time. The coefficients that are 
statistically significant in the fixed effects model are the number of Segments on the outcome 
variables Custom (FE 1: t = 4.89 and FE 2: t = 4.92) and Custom Value (FE 3: t = -2.66 and  
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FE 4: t = -2.67). An explanation for the insignificance of remaining variables may emerge from 
the model specification itself. Fixed effects regression specifically estimates changes within a firm. 
The fixed effects model shows the effect on a firm’s use of extensions over time when independent 
variables also change over time. Since the data sample is only for 3 years, the model that examines 
the changes within firms and between time periods, may not yield appropriate and expected results. 
Coefficients on Segments for both outcome variables Custom and Custom Value are significant at 
the 1% level and 5% level respectively. These results may simply indicate that observed firms had 
high variations in their segment development. The fixed effects model remains relevant however, 
for the purpose of this research, since it estimates the effects of changes within a firm’s 
characteristics on the use of custom tags. For the fixed effects model, a dataset with additional 
years of observation could result in the statistical significance of coefficients. These findings may 
indicate that the model is not entirely representative for explaining the relationship of complexity 
and/or company quality of the financial report to uses of custom tags.  
6. Conclusion  
In 2009 the US SEC made it mandatory for firms to file interactive data using XBRL. The 
mandate created a new body of literature examining the effects of the new system. Studies since 
have shown that XBRL improved information efficiency and accessibility expanding the use value 
as well as the scope of research relevant to financial statements. XBRL data taxonomy uses 
standard tags to provide easily accessible and machine-readable structured financial data. The 
SEC, however, also allows for creation of custom tags in cases where a disclosed value cannot be 
explained by the existing standard tag. The overuse of custom tags results in a reduction of 
financial report quality, diminishing its comparability and the usability of the filing (Dhole, Lobo, 
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Mishra, and Pal, 2015). I attempt to further build on XBRL literature by examining use of custom 
tags and their association with complex and/or low-quality financial statements. 
The hypothesis states that there is a higher level of custom tag implementation among firms 
identifying with complex systems of operation as well as firm’s low-quality financial statements. 
My analysis reveals that a higher percentage of custom tags with respect to the total tags, have a 
positive correlation with low-quality financial reports as proxied by the ‘unqualified’ auditor’s 
opinion, and measures for material weakness. I also find that companies identified with lower 
quality financial disclosures report higher dollar values under custom tags. The results show that 
companies identified with proxies for complex operational structure including fraction of 
intangible assets, and the number of segments, are not necessarily associated with inordinate use 
of extensions.  
Research subsequent to this study could implement a string-matching method to identify 
companies that have lowest differences in descriptive sequences between their use of extensions 
and the FASB’s standard taxonomy. Research beyond the scope of this paper can provide further 
insights into the results of this study and their potential implications. String matching technique 
projects the intended uses of extensions by identifying ‘legitimate’ extensions that were properly 
placed to describe unique line items, and ‘incorrect’ extensions that could have been explained by 
the already existing standard tags. Utilization of string-matching technique can illuminate the 
relationship between the quality of financial reports and the type of extensions associated with 
which they are associated. This method can also establish Big Four’s association with both 
‘legitimate’ or ‘incorrect’ types of extensions. This additional metric provides a more accurate 
representation of low-quality financial statements. 
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The significance of this study is its contribution to ongoing efforts to maximize 
transparency in financial statement reports and financial markets, including the refinement of 
policies that provide for comparable and reliable data for analysis. This research provides a 
platform for further investigation; its initial findings must be interpreted with caution, since the 
post-XBRL sample period (3 years) as well as chosen descriptive variables are not strong enough 
to draw definitive conclusions about the increased uses of XBRL extensions.  
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7. Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Sample Selection 
Details    Observations  
 
Initial observations sample of tags from EDGAR from period 2015 - 2017                 6,561,207 
  # of firms in 2015           8,264 
# of firms in 2016           7,504 
# of firms in 2017           6,923 
 
New transformed observations sample with a sum of tags for each CIK                     46,982 
(Previous sample of observations included individual string names of tags in the statement)     
     
 
Initial observations sample of financial and segment variables from Compustat      17,249 
Initial observations sample of auditor and internal control variables from Audit Analytic    33,614 
 
Merged sample (after removing observations for CIK with no data for all 3 years)     36,163  
 
Observations lost as a result of merging and                               (21,733) 
removing missing values of independent variables     
               Final # of observed firms from 2015 - 2017                                     4,329 
 
Final Sample                         11,430 
The table above is based on a sample of total observations drawn from the EDGAR, Audit Analytics and Compustat 
North America Industrial Annual data file. The sample covers the period from 2015 to 2017. 
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Table 2: Audit Opinion Codification for the variable Unqualified 
Code Name Description 
 
0 
 
Unaudited 
 
The financial statements were not audited because they represent 
consolidated accounts and the auditor's letter refers only to parent 
accounts. 
1 Unqualified The financial statements are presented fairly, and the auditing firm 
approves of the accounting principles reflected in the financial 
statements, the consistency of their application and the adequacy of 
financial disclosure. 
2 Qualified The financial statements are presented fairly, but the auditing firm is 
concerned about either limitation on the scope of the examination or 
unsatisfactory financial statement presentations. 
3 No opinion The auditing firm does not express an opinion regarding the company's 
capability to continue business operations. 
4 Unqualified with 
additional 
language 
The auditing firm's opinion is unqualified, but explanatory language 
has been added to the standard report. 
5 Adverse opinion This code indicates that the financial statements are not presented 
fairly, and the auditing firm does not approve of the accounting 
principles reflected in the financial statements, the consistency of their 
applications or the adequacy of financial disclosure. 
Compustat description of audit opinion codification.  
This study drops all observations for unaudited companies.  
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Table 3: Variable Definitions. 
   Description and the definitions of all variables used in the analysis of this paper.  
Each variable observation represents a company-year combination. 
Name Definition 
Custom Percentage of tags that are custom out of the total number of 
tags in each company-year. 
Custom Value Dollar value of custom tags divided by firm’s Total Assets 
and is averaged per firm-year filing. 
lnIntan_ta Natural Log r 
 
atio for of Intangible Assets to Total Assets  
Segments Number of segments in a company 
Big Four 1 if the auditor is a part of the Big Four and 0 otherwise 
Unqualified An audit opinion: 1 if a company has been given an 
‘unqualified’ rating and 0 otherwise 
Count Weakness Numerical count of material weaknesses in a company. 
 
Weakness 
 
Material weakness identified in assessment of internal  
controls: 1 if a company has a material weakness and 0 
otherwise 
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Table 4: Correlation Coefficients 
 
Variables Custom lnIntan_ta Custom Value Segment Unqualified Big Four 
Count 
Weakness Weakness 
Custom 1   
         
         
lnIntan_ta 
0.023* 
1 
      
(0.036)       
         
Custom 
Value 
0.182* 0.012 
1 
     
(0.000) (0.270)      
         
Segment 
0.019* 0.02 -0.129* 
1 
    
(0.046) (0.074) (0.000)     
         
         
Unqualified 
-0.069* -0.001 -0.267* 0.131* 
1 
   
(0.000) (0.919) (0.000) (0.000)    
         
Big Four  
0.055* 0.045* -0.175* 0.277* 0.263* 
1 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
         
Count 
weakness 
0.032* 0.01  0.173*  -0.137* -0.287* -0.286* 
1 
 
(0.001) (0.352) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
         
Weakness 
0.044* 0.012 0.044*  -0.166* -0.345* -0.359*  0.790* 
1 
(0.000) (0.286) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
P values are in parenthesis 
* Two tailed statistical significance at 5 percent 
Variables are defined in Table 3 
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                  Table 5: Summary Statistics   
This table shows summary statistics for a sample of 4,329 firms for the period 2015–2017. Initial data from EDGAR 
was combined with additional data from Compustat and Audit Analytics.  
 
Name 
 
Obs 
 
Mean 
 
Std.Dev. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
Number of Companies: 4,329  
 
    
 
Custom 
 
 
11430 
 
18.18 
 
10.74 
 
.488 
 
100 
lnIntan_ta 8272 .602 2.982 -134.75 132.41 
      
Custom Value 11,337 .4786 2.547 -29.65 24.56 
 
Segments 11248 9.412 8.832 1 162 
 
Count Weakness 10769 .372 1.081 0 20 
 
Weakness 10769 .159 .365 0 1 
 
Big Four 11430 .625 .484 0 1 
Unqualified 11430 .756 .429 0 1 
 
Variables are defined in Table 3 
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Table 6: Clustered Standard Errors: Custom 
 
         1)  Customit = β0 + β1lnIntan_tait + β2Unqualifiedit + β3BigFourit + β4Segmentit + β5Weaknessit + εit 
 
        2)  Customit = β0 + β1lnIntan_tait + β2Unqualifiedit + β3BigFourit + β4Segmentit + β5CountWeaknessit i + εit 
 
  
Expected 
sign 
CSE 1: 
 Custom 
Expected 
sign 
CSE 2:  
Custom  
lnIntan_ta + 
0.056 
+ 
0.0616 
(1.02) (1.12) 
     
Segments + 
0.0268 
+ 
0.025 
(1.4) (1.31) 
     
Big Four ? 
2.051*** 
? 
1.853*** 
(5.38) (4.86) 
     
Unqualified - 
-1.597*** 
- 
-1.793*** 
(-4.18) (-4.55) 
     
Weakness + 
2.393***    
(4.03) 
     
Count 
Weakness 
   + 
0.561** 
(3.16) 
     
Constant  
17.14***  17.59*** 
(36.44) (36.16) 
Observations 
  
7768 
  
7768 
Adjusted R2   0.016   0.014 
T-statistics in parenthesis. 
***, **, * Indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively 
Variables are defined in Table 3 
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Table 7: Clustered Standard Errors: Custom Value 
 
      3) Custom Valueit = β0 + β1lnIntan_tait + β2Unqualifiedit + β3BigFourit + β4Segmentit + β5Weaknessit i + εit 
 
      4) Custom Valueit = β0 + β1lnIntan_tait + β2Unqualifiedit + β3BigFourit + β4Segmentit + β5CountWeaknessit + εit 
 
 
Expected 
sign 
CSE 1:  
Custom Value 
Expected 
sign 
CSE 2:  
Custom Value 
lnIntan_ta + 
0.0177 
+ 
0.0186 
(-1.54) (-1.54) 
     
Segments + 
-0.0116 
+ 
-0.0118 
(-3.23) (-3.30) 
     
Big Four ? 
-0.192** 
? 
-0.221 
(-2.74) (-3.18) 
     
Unqualified - 
-0.713*** 
- 
-0.741 
(-10.39) (-10.69) 
     
Weakness + 
0.0899***    
(4.74) 
     
Count 
Weakness 
   + 
0.126*** 
(4.46) 
     
Constant  
0.961***  1.026
*** 
(10.39) (11.18) 
Observations 
  
7643 
  
7750 
Adjusted R2   0.58   0.037 
T-statistics in parenthesis. 
***, **, * Indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively 
Variables are defined in Table 3 
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Table 8: Fixed Effects 
 
   1a|3a) Yit = β0 + β1lnIntan_tait + β2Unqualifiedit + β3BigFourit + β4Segmentit + β5Weaknessit + γi + δt + εit 
 
   2a|4a) Yit =β0 + β1lnIntan_tait + β2Unqualifiedit + β3BigFourit + β4Segmentit + β5CountWeaknessit + γi + δt + εit 
 
Y represents the dependent variables Custom (FE 1 and FE 2) and Custom Value (FE 3 and FE 4) in the Fixed 
Effects regression model. 
  
FE 1      
Custom 
FE 2  
Custom 
FE 3  
Custom Value 
FE 4  
Custom Value 
lnIntan_ta 
-0.0107 -0.0118 2.103** 2.105** 
(-0.99) (-1.09) (-0.68)  (-0.69) 
     
Segments 
0.0764***  0.0769*** -0.00882** -0.0088** 
(4.89) (4.92) (-2.67) (-2.66) 
     
Big Four 
-0.119 -0.131 0.195 0.194 
(-0.19) (-0.21) (1.05) (1.106) 
     
Unqualified 
-0.0418 -0.0395 -0.127* -0.126* 
(-0.24) (-0.24) (-1.98) (-2.00) 
     
Weakness 
0.389 
  
-0.0137 
  
(1.1) (-0.77)      
Count Weakness   
0.194 
  
-0.0196 
(1.68) (-0.63) 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 17.12
*** 17.12*** 0.27 0.268 
(35.02) (35.16) (1.9) (1.91) 
     
Observations 7768 7768 7750 7750 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.003 
T-statistics in parenthesis. 
***, **, * Indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively 
Variables are defined in Table 3 
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